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Abstract
We consider strong law of large numbers (SLLN) in the framework of game-
theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We prove several versions of SLLN
for the case that Reality’s moves are unbounded. Our game-theoretic versions of
SLLN largely correspond to standard measure-theoretic results. However game-
theoretic proofs are different from measure-theoretic ones in the explicit consid-
eration of various hedges. In measure-theoretic proofs existence of moments are
assumed, whereas in our game-theoretic proofs we assume availability of various
hedges to Skeptic for finite prices.
Keywords and phrases: Borel-Cantelli lemma, call option, Doob’s upcrossing lemma,
Kronecker’s lemma, Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law, martingale convergence theorem.
1 Introduction
In the framework of game-theoretic probability, proof of SLLN is simple if Reality’s moves
are bounded. In [4] we showed that a single simple strategy based on past averages of Re-
ality’s moves forces SLLN for the case of bounded Reality’s moves. For the special case of
the coin-tossing game path behavior and convergence rate of SLLN can be very explicitly
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stated ([5],[8]). However when Reality’s moves are not bounded, the proof becomes more
complicated due to consideration of availability of hedges to Skeptic. Under the require-
ment of the collateral duty that Skeptic has to keep his capital always nonnegative, he has
to use some form of hedge at each round. In Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), Kol-
mogorov’s SLLN is proved under the availability of the variance hedge (quadratic hedge).
Shafer and Vovk consider the case that the price of the variance hedge is announced by
Forecaster for each round, but for simplicity in this paper we omit Forecaster from the
protocol and consider the case that hedges carry constant prices throughout the game.
Availability of the quadratic hedge is natural and convenient. However the purpose of
this paper is to investigate SLLN under other types of hedges.
In measure-theoretic probability, the usual and most elegant form of SLLN is stated
for the sample average x¯n = (1/n)(x1 + · · · + xn) of i.i.d. random variables, where only
the existence of the measure-theoretic expected value E|xn| < ∞ is assumed. However
Kolmogorov’s SLLN proved in Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) does not correspond to
this version and a question remains whether a corresponding game-theoretic result holds or
not. Some considerations of this problem are given in Chapter 4 of [9]. The usual measure-
theoretic result depends strongly on the assumption of identical distribution of the random
variables. On the other hand the basic feature of the game-theoretic probability is that the
game is a martingale and there is a question of how to impose identical behavior to Reality
at each round. In this paper we argue that the assumption of the identical distribution
in measure-theoretic framework can be replaced by the availability of countable number
of weak hedges.
For the most part we follow the standard proofs of SLLN in measure-theoretic proba-
bility. For example we use truncation and Kronecker’s lemma. However our proofs differ
from standard measure-theoretic proofs in explicit construction of Skeptic’s strategy which
requires Skeptic to observe his collateral duty. In addition our proof is more an extension
of the proof for the bounded case of Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), rather than an
extension of their proof in Chapter 4 using the quadratic hedge.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up notations and give
some preliminary results. In Section 3 we prove a version of SLLN under the assumption
of availability of a single hedge. In Section 4 we prove a game-theoretic version of SLLN
for i.i.d. variables under the assumption of availability of countable hedges. We extend
it to a Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law in Section 5. Finally in Section 6 we discuss
various aspects of our proofs and the assumption of availability of infinite number of
hedges.
2 Notation and preliminaries
In this section we summarize our notations and some preliminary results. We follow the
notation of Shafer and Vovk (2001). ξ = x1x2 . . . denotes an infinite path of Reality’s
moves and ξn = x1 . . . xn denotes the partial path up to round n. For a strategy P of
Skeptic, KPn (ξ) = K
P
n (ξ
n) denotes the capital process. Starting with a positive initial
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capital of K0 = δ > 0, Skeptic observes his collateral duty by using P if
KPn (ξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ, ∀n. (1)
We also say that P satisfies the collateral duty with the initial capital δ. Note that P
satisfies the collateral duty with initial capital δ if and only if P/δ satisfies the duty with
the initial capital 1. In view of this fact, we simply say that P satisfies the collateral duty
if P satisfies the duty with some initial capital δ > 0. When P satisfies the collateral
duty, the capital process KP is called a (game-theoretic) non-negative martingale.
We call a function h(x) of Reality’s move x a hedge if it is non-negative (h(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈
R) and has a finite price 0 < ν <∞. Skeptic is allowed to buy arbitrary amount of h(x)
with the unit price ν. In Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), they consider the variance
hedge h(x) = x2. In view of the unbounded forecasting game in Chapter 4 of Shafer and
Vovk (2001), we first consider the following protocol with a single hedge.
The Unbounded Forecasting Game with a Single Hedge
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R, Vn ≥ 0.
Reality announces xn ∈ R.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn + Vn(h(xn)− ν)
END FOR
Availability of the variance hedge h(x) = x2 is very convenient, because Skeptic can
then construct a martingale which is a quadratic form of Reality’s moves. This fact is used
by Shafer and Vovk in their proof. However SLLN can be proved under other hedges. In
Section 3 we will prove that SLLN is forced if the absolute moment hedge of order 1 + ǫ,
ǫ > 0,
h(x) = |x|1+ǫ
is available to Skeptic. Naturally we are tempted to consider the absolute moment hedge
h(x) = |x|
in the above protocol, corresponding to the measure-theoretic SLLN of i.i.d. random
variables with finite expectation. However it is essential to point out that SLLN is not
forced under the availability of h(x) = |x| alone. Since this fact is important, we state it as
a proposition. The following proposition is stated in view of the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund
strong law in Section 5.
Proposition 2.1. Consider the unbounded forecasting game with a single hedge h(x) =
|x|r, r > 0. There exists no strategy P of Skeptic satisfying the collateral duty, such that
limnK
P
n =∞ whenever (x1 + · · ·+ xn)/n
1/r 6→ 0.
Proof of this proposition, following Section 4.3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), is given in
Appendix A. Unfortunately it requires a measure-theoretic argument.
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Figure 1: Symmetric call option type hedge
Because of Proposition 2.1 with r = 1, we need to assume that more hedges in addition
to h(x) = |x| are available to Skeptic in order to prove SLLN corresponding to the sample
average of i.i.d. random variables with finite measure-theoretic expected value E|xn| <∞.
Let
H = {hλ | λ ∈ Λ}
denote a set of hedges available to Skeptic in each round. For example in Section 4 we
consider the set of symmetric call option type hedges (“strangle hedges”, Chapter 10 of
[3])
H = {(|x| − k)+ | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . },
where x+ = max(0, x). (|x| − k)+ is depicted in Figure 1. We assume that hλ is available
to Skeptic with a constant finite positive price vhλ . Skeptic is allowed to buy any amount
of countable number of hedges h1, h2, . . . from H. If Skeptic buys Vi ∈ R units of hi,
i = 1, 2, . . . , then he is required that the sum
∑∞
i=1 Vivhi converges to a finite value. Note
that here for a set of hedges we are allowing Skeptic to sell a hedge (Vi < 0), whereas in
the case of a single hedge Skeptic can obviously only buy the hedge. By allowing Skeptic
to sell hedges, he can combine various hedges to construct a variety of hedges (Chapter 10
of [3], Section 9.3 of [1]). Based on these considerations we set up the following protocol.
The Unbounded Forecasting Game with a Set of Hedges
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R, hn1, hn2, · · · ∈ H, Vn1, Vn2, · · · ∈ R
s.t.
∑
i Vnivhni converges to a finite value.
Reality announces xn ∈ R.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn +
∑
i Vni(hni(xn)− vhni).
END FOR
In our proofs we combine Skeptic’s strategies to force intersection of events. From
Section 3.2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), a strategy P weakly forces an event E if it satisfies
the collateral duty and lim supn
∑
nK
P
n (ξ) = ∞ for every ξ 6∈ E. In this case we also
say that E happens almost surely. If lim supn is replaced by limn, then P forces E. Now
consider two events E1 and E2. We say that a strategy P weakly forces E2 conditional
on E1 if it satisfies the collateral duty and
lim sup
n
KQn (ξ) =∞, ∀ξ ∈ E1 ∩ E
C
2 .
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Now we state the following lemma, which is slightly stronger than Lemma 3.2 of Shafer
and Vovk (2001).
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that Skeptic can weakly force E1 and furthermore he can weakly
force E2 conditional on E1. Then he can weakly force E1 ∩ E2.
Proof. Let P1 denote a strategy weakly forcing E1 and let P2 denote a strategy weakly
forcing E2 conditional on E1. Let P = (1/2)(P1 + P2). Note that
(E1 ∩ E2)
C = EC1 ∪ (E1 ∩ E
C
2 ).
For ξ ∈ EC1 lim supnK
P
n (ξ) =∞ since lim supnK
P1
n (ξ) =∞. Similarly for For ξ ∈ E1∩E
C
2
lim supnK
P
n (ξ) =∞ since lim supnK
P2
n (ξ) =∞.
It is clear that Lemma 2.1 can be generalized to the sequence of events E1, E2, . . . ,
such that Ei is weakly forced conditional on E1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ei−1.
Finally we state and discuss the game-theoretic martingale convergence theorem given
in Lemma 4.5 of Shafer and Vovk (2001).
Lemma 2.2. A non-negative martingale KP converges to a non-negative finite value
almost surely.
As seen from the proof of Lemma 4.5 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) this theorem is based
on Doob’s upcrossing lemma in the game-theoretic setting. We use this lemma in our
proofs in an essential way. As discussed at the beginning of this section, when we say
that KP is a non-negative martingale, it means that Skeptic observes his collateral duty
(1) with the strategy P starting with a positive initial capital K0 > 0. In this case he
can construct another strategy Q satisfying the collateral duty starting with an arbitrary
small initial capital δ > 0 such that
lim
n
KQn (ξ) =∞
whenever KPn does not converge. As in Section 4.2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) or Chapter
12 of Williams (1991) we use Lemma 2.2 in conjunction with Kronecker’s lemma.
3 SLLN with a single hedge
In this section we give sufficient conditions for SLLN in the unbounded forecasting game
with a single hedge. For simplicity we only consider symmetric hedge h(x) = h(|x|)
depending only on |x|. We assume several conditions for h(|x|) ≥ 0.
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(A1) For some c > 0, h(|x|) ≥ |x| for |x| ≥ c. (2)
(A2) For some c > 0 and for all α ≥ 1
h(|x|)
|x|α
is monotone increasing or decreasing for |x| ≥ c. (3)
(A3) For some c > 0,
∞∑
n>c
1
h(n)
<∞. (4)
In our proof the condition (A3) is essential for SLLN with a single hedge, as shown
in Proposition 3.1 below. On the other hand (A2) and the symmetry of h are assumed
for convenience for our proofs. c > 0 in the conditions can be easily handled and for
simplicity we assume c = 0 in our proofs below. By (A2), there exists some α0 > 0 such
that h(|x|) is monotone increasing in |x| for α > α0 and monotone decreasing in |x| for
α < α0.
Now we state the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that a single hedge h(x) satisfying (A1)–(A3) is available to
Skeptic. Then in the unbounded forecasting game with the single hedge h(x), Skeptic can
force x¯n → 0.
Take h(x) = |x|1+ǫ, ǫ > 0, then (A1)–(A3) hold and SLLN is forced. SLLN is forced
even for
h(x) = |x|(log |x|)2.
However as shown in Proposition 2.1, SLLN is not forced for h(x) = |x|.
Before starting the proof of Theorem 3.1 we show that the condition (A3) is also
necessary for the existence of a strategy weakly forcing SLLN.
Proposition 3.1. Consider h(x) ≥ 0 with h(0) = 0 and
∑
n 1/h(n) = ∞. Then in
the unbounded forecasting game with this single hedge h(x), there exists no strategy P of
Skeptic satisfying the collateral duty, such that limnK
P
n =∞ whenever (x1+· · ·+xn)/n 6→
0.
Proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A.
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 3.1 in a series of lemmas.
By Lemma 3.1 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) we only need to show that Skeptic can weakly
force x¯n → 0.
Lemma 3.1. Let
E1 = {ξ |
∑
n
h(xn)
h(n)
<∞}.
Under the conditions (A1)–(A3) Skeptic can force E1.
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Proof. By (A3) let C =
∑
n 1/h(n) <∞. Consider the following strategy P
Mn ≡ 0, Vn =
1
Cνh(n)
.
where 0 < ν < ∞ is the price of the hedge h. For this strategy, starting with the initial
capital of K0 = 1, the capital process Kn is written as
Kn = 1 +
n∑
i=1
1
Cνh(i)
(h(xi)− ν)
= 1−
1
C
n∑
i=1
1
h(i)
+
1
Cν
n∑
i=1
h(xi)
h(i)
≥
1
Cν
n∑
i=1
h(xi)
h(i)
.
Therefore P satisfies the collateral duty and on EC1 Kn diverges to +∞. Therefore P
forces E1.
Note that the same argument with C =
∑
n 1/n
2 shows that Skeptic can force
E ′1 = {ξ |
∑
n
h(xn)
n2
<∞}. (5)
Furthermore Lemma 3.1 implies the following Borel-Cantelli type result.
Lemma 3.2. Let
E2 = {ξ | |xn| ≥ n for only finite number of n}. (6)
Under the conditions (A1)–(A3) Skeptic can force E2.
Proof. By (A2) h(|x|)/|x| is monotone. If it is monotone decreasing (A3) can not hold.
Therefore h(|x|)/|x| has to be monotone increasing and h(|x|) is itself monotone increasing.
Therefore for z > 0
h(z)
h(n)
≥ I[n,∞)(z),
where I[n,∞)(·) is the indicator function of the interval [n,∞). It follows that E1 ⊂ E2.
It should be noted that this lemma is essentially the first part of Borel-Cantelli lemma.
For convenience we state a game-theoretic version of the first part of Borel-Cantelli lemma.
The proof is the same as in Lemma 3.1 and omitted.
Lemma 3.3. (The first part of Borel-Cantelli) Let E1, E2, . . . be a sequence of events
such that the sum of the upper probabilities is finite
∑
n P¯ (En) < ∞. Then Skeptic can
force
(lim sup
n
En)
C = {En only for finite n}.
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The following lemma concerns the evaluation of the variance of truncated variables in
the usual proof of SLLN.
Lemma 3.4. Let
E3 = {ξ |
∑
n
x2n
n2
I{|xn|≤n} <∞}. (7)
Under the conditions (A1)–(A3) Skeptic can force E3.
Proof. First consider the case that h(x)/x2 is monotone increasing. Then adjusting some
constants we can assume h(x) ≥ x2 for all x without loss of generality. Then∑
n
x2n
n2
I{|xn|≤n} ≤
∑
n
x2n
n2
≤
∑
n
h(xn)
n2
and E ′1 ⊂ E3, where E
′
1 is given in (5). Therefore Skeptic can force E3.
Next consider the case that h(x)/x2 is monotone decreasing. For 0 < z ≤ n we have
h(z)
z2
≥
h(n)
n2
.
Multiplying both sides by n2/h(z) we have
z2
n2
≤
h(z)
h(n)
.
Then ∑
n
x2n
n2
I{|xn|≤n} ≤
∑
n
h(xn)
h(n)
and E1 ⊂ E3.
From Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.4 Skeptic can force E2 ∩ E3.
Lemma 3.5. Let 0 < c ≤ 1/[2(1 + ν/h(1))]. Then for all x
−c
|x|
n
+ c
h(x)− ν
h(n)
≥ −
1
2
.
Proof. Since h(z)/z is increasing in z > 0, for z ≥ n we have h(n)/n ≤ h(z)/z. Multiply-
ing by z/h(n) we have
h(z)
h(n)
−
z
n
≥ 0, z ≥ n.
For 0 ≤ z ≤ n obviously
h(z)
h(n)
−
z
n
≥ −1.
Therefore for all z ≥ 0 we have
h(z)− ν
h(n)
−
z
n
≥ −1 −
ν
h(n)
≥ −1 −
ν
h(1)
and this proves the lemma.
8
Finally the following lemma proves Theorem 3.1 by Kronecker’s lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Let
E4 = {ξ |
∑
n
xn
n
converges to a finite value}. (8)
Under the conditions (A1)–(A3) Skeptic can weakly force E4 conditional on E1.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/[2(1 + ν/h(1))]. Consider the following strategy P+:
Mn = ǫKn−1
1
n
, Vn = ǫKn−1
1
h(n)
.
Then by Lemma 3.5
Kn = Kn−1(1 + ǫ
xn
n
+ ǫ
h(xn)− ν
h(n)
) ≥
1
2
Kn−1
and P+ satisfies the collateral duty. Similarly the strategy P− withMn = −ǫKn−1/n, Vn =
ǫKn−1/h(n) satisfies the collateral duty. By the game-theoretic martingale convergence
theorem (Lemma 2.2) both KP
+
n and K
P−
n converge to a non-negative finite value almost
surely. Then both logKP
+
n and logK
P−
n converge to a finite value or −∞ almost surely.
As in Lemma 3.3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) we use the inequality t ≥ log(1+t) ≥ t−t2
for all t ≥ −1/2. Then the logarithm of the capital process for P+ starting with K0 = 1
is bounded as
ǫ
n∑
i=1
(xi
i
−
h(xi)− ν
h(i)
)
≥ logKP
+
n
≥ ǫ
n∑
i=1
(xi
i
−
h(xi)− ν
h(i)
)
− ǫ2
n∑
i=1
(xi
i
−
h(xi)− ν
h(i)
)2
. (9)
On E1, each of the following infinite sums is finite.∑
n
h(xn)
h(n)
,
∑
n
ν
h(n)
,
∑
n
x2n
n2
,
∑
n
h(xn)
2
h(n)2
,
∑
n
ν2
h(n)2
.
By the inequality
(a1 + · · ·+ am)
2 ≤ m(a21 + · · ·+ a
2
m)
on E1 the second term on the right-hand side of (9) converges to a finite value:
∞∑
n=1
(xn
n
−
h(xn)− ν
h(n)
)2
<∞.
Therefore conditional on E1 P
+ weakly forces
lim sup
n
n∑
i=1
xi
i
<∞.
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Similarly conditional on E1 P
− weakly forces
lim inf
n
n∑
i=1
xi
i
< −∞.
It follows that the case lim logKP
+
n = −∞ is eliminated and logK
P+
n converges to a finite
value almost surely.
Now consider (9) for the interval n ≤ i ≤ n′. Then
ǫ
n′∑
i=n
(xi
i
−
h(xi)− ν
h(i)
)
≥ logKP
+
n′ − logK
P+
n−1
≥ ǫ
n′∑
i=n
(xi
i
−
h(xi)− ν
h(i)
)
− ǫ2
n′∑
i=n
(xi
i
−
h(xi)− ν
h(i)
)2
.
Now by Cauchy criterion we see that
∑
n xn/n converges almost surely.
4 SLLN with countable hedges
In this section we prove a version of game-theoretic SLLN which corresponds to the
usual measure-theoretic SLLN for the sample average of i.i.d. random variables with finite
expectation. As shown in Proposition 2.1, the availability of a single h(x) = |x| is not
sufficient. It seems that an essential ingredient of measure-theoretic proofs of SLLN
for this case is that the expected values of truncation are uniformly bounded by the
assumption of identical distribution. Hence we consider that countable number of hedges
are available with constant prices at each round of the game. We assume that the prices
are given in such a way that the game is coherent, i.e. the game does not present an
arbitrage opportunity to Skeptic (see Section 7.1 of [7] or [8]).
As mentioned in Section 2, for our game-theoretic version of SLLN we assume that
the set of symmetric call option type hedges with integral exercise prices k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
H = {hk(x) = (|x| − k)+ | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . } (10)
are available to Skeptic. In particular |x| = (|x| − 0)+ is available to Skeptic. Let νk
denote the price of hk(x) = (|x| − k)+. We also assume that Skeptic is allowed to sell
hedges and combine them, as long as he observes his collateral duty. For example he can
create a new hedge
(|x| − k)+ − (|x| − k − 1)+ =


0, |x| ≤ k
|x| − k, k < |x| ≤ k + 1
1, |x| > k + 1.
This new hedge carries the price of νk − νk+1 ≥ 0. We may call this hedge “symmetric
bull spread” (c.f. Chapter 10 of [3]).
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For truncation arguments below we also consider “symmetric trapezoidal hedge”. For
k ≥ 1 define
Tk(x) = (|x| − (k − 1))+ − (|x| − k)+ −
(
(|x| − (k + 1))+ − (|x| − (k + 2))+
)
=


0, |x| ≤ k − 1
|x| − (k − 1), k − 1 < |x| ≤ k
1, k < |x| ≤ k + 1
k + 2− |x|, k + 1 < |x| ≤ k + 2
0, k + 2 < |x|
≥ I[k,k+1](|x|)
with the price µk = νk+2−νk+1−νk+νk−1. For k = 0, T0(x) = 1−((|x|−1)+−(|x|−2)+),
which is a single trapezoid. Symmetric bull spread and the positive side of symmetric
trapezoidal hedge are depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively.
❅
❅
❅
−k
 
 
 
k−k − 1 k + 1
Figure 2: Symmetric bull spread
 
 
 
k − 1
❅
❅
❅
k k + 1 k + 2
Figure 3: Symmetric trapezoidal hedge (positive side only)
Now we state the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that the set of hedges H = {hk(x) = (|x| − k)+ | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . }
are available to Skeptic. Then in the unbounded forecasting game with H Skeptic can force
x¯n → 0.
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of this theorem. As in the previous
section we prove it by a series of lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 Skeptic can force E2 in (6).
Proof. For k ≥ 1, (|x| − k + 1)+ − (|x| − k)+ ≥ I[k,∞)(|x|) and
∞∑
n=1
(
(|xn| − n+ 1)+ − (|xn| − n)+
)
≥
∞∑
n=1
I[n,∞)(|xn|).
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The left-hand side can be bought with the total finite price of ν0. The rest of the proof is
the same as in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 4.2. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 Skeptic can force E3 in (7).
Proof. At round n Skeptic is to buy (k+1)2 units of the symmetric trapezoidal hedge Tk
for each k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. We note
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2Tk(xn) ≥ x
2
nI{|xn|≤n}.
Dividing the above by n2 and summing up over all rounds n = 1, 2, . . . , we have
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2
n2
Tk(xn) ≥
∞∑
n=1
x2n
n2
I{|xn|≤n}.
Now we evaluate the total price of the left-hand side. Since Tk is available at each round,
the price is the same if we replace xn by x1 in Tk. Then
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2
n2
Tk(x1) =
∞∑
n=1
1
n2
n∑
l=1
l2Tl−1(x1) =
∞∑
l=1
l2Tl−1(x1)
∞∑
n=l
1
n2
≤ 2
∞∑
l=1
lTl−1(x1) ≤ 6|x1|.
As noted above |x1| is available to Skeptic with finite price ν0, so that the left-hand side
is also available to him with the total finite price
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2
n2
µk ≤ 6ν0.
The rest of the proof is the same as in Lemma 3.1.
In the following xn hedged by (|xn| − n)+ is denoted as
xn,n = xn + (|xn| − n)+ =


−n, xn < −n,
xn, −n ≤ xn ≤ n,
2xn − n, xn > n.
This has the price νn. Similarly we denote x˜n,n = −xn+ (|xn| − n)+ which is −xn hedged
by (|xn| − n)+. Note that
xn,n ≥ −n, x˜n,n ≥ −n.
On E2, xn,n and xnI{|xn|≤n} differ only for finite number of n. Therefore conditional on
E2, Skeptic can force
E ′3 = {ξ |
∑
n
x2n,n
n2
<∞}, E ′3
′ = {ξ |
∑
n
x˜2n,n
n2
<∞}. (11)
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Lemma 4.3. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 and conditional on E2, Skeptic can
force
E5 = {ξ |
∑
n
(xn,n − νn)
2
n2
<∞}
Proof. Since (xn,n − νn)
2 ≤ 2x2n,n + 2ν
2
n
N∑
n=1
(xn,n − νn)
2
n2
≤ 2
N∑
n=1
x2n,n
n2
+ 2
N∑
n=1
ν2n
n2
≤ 2
N∑
n=1
x2n,n
n2
+ 2ν20
π2
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By (11), conditional on E2, Skeptic can force
∑∞
n=1 x
2
n,n/n
2 < ∞. Therefore conditional
on E2, he can force E5
Similarly Skeptic can force E5 with xn,n replaced by x˜n,n.
Finally the following lemma proves Theorem 4.1 in conjunction with Kronecker’s
lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 Skeptic can weakly force
E ′4 = {ξ |
∑
n
xn,n − νn
n
converges to a finite value}
conditional on E2 ∩ E
′
3.
Proof. We take ǫ as
0 < ǫ <
1
2(1 + ν0)
,
and consider Skeptic’s strategy betting ǫKn−1/n on xn,n−νn at round n. Then his capital
at the end of round n is
Kn = Kn−1(1 +
ǫ
n
(xn,n − νn)) = K0
n∏
i=1
(1 +
ǫ
i
(xi,i − νi)).
By the choice of ǫ and |xi,i/i| ≤ 1,
ǫ
i
(xi,i − νi) ≥ −
1
2
,
so that from log(1 + t) ≥ t− t2 for t ≥ −1/2, his log capital is bounded from below as
logKn ≥ logK0 + ǫ
n∑
i=1
xi,i − νi
i
− ǫ2
n∑
i=1
(xi,i − νi)
2
i2
.
In the right-hand side the third term is bounded on E5. By considering this inequality
for the interval n ≤ i ≤ n′, we have
logKn′ − logKn−1 ≥ ǫ
n′∑
i=n
xi,i − νi
i
− ǫ2
n′∑
i=n
(xi,i − νi)
2
i2
.
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As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, considering both xn,n and x˜n,n, logKn converges to a finite
limit almost surely, and thus by Cauchy criterion we see that
n∑
i=1
xi,i − νi
i
converges almost surely.
As proved in Appendix B, νn → 0 as n→∞. Then by Kronecker’s lemma we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi,i − νi) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi,i −
1
n
n∑
i=1
νi → 0 as n→∞.
In the above, (1/n)
∑n
i=1 νi → 0 so that
∑n
i=1 xi,i/n also converges to 0. Since xn and
xn,n differ only for finite number of n on E2, it is concluded that x¯n converges to 0 almost
surely. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5 Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law
In this section we consider a remarkable generalization by Marcinkiewicz and Zygmund
(See [2], [6]) of Kolmogorov’s measure-theoretic SLLN for i.i.d. random variables with
finite expected value E|xn| < ∞. Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law asserts that for
i.i.d. random variables x1, x2, . . . with E|xn|
r < ∞ for 0 < r < 2 and Exn = 0 when
1 ≤ r < 2, the following measure-theoretic SLLN holds
x1 + · · ·+ xn
n1/r
→ 0 as n→∞ a.s.
Considering the meaning of the hedge |x|r for x in betting games, we treat the case
1 < r < 2 and for this case establish a game-theoretic version of Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund
SLLN. As noted in Proposition 2.1, the availability of a single h(x) = |x|r is again not
sufficient. Hence here, for the game-theoretic Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund SLLN we assume
that the following set of hedges are available to Skeptic.
Hr = H1r ∪H2r, where
{
H1r = {hkr(x) = (|x|
r − k)+ | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . }
H2r = {hk1/r(x) = (|x| − k
1/r)+ | k = 0, 1, 2, . . .}
. (12)
Let νkr denote the price of hkr(x) = (|x|
r−k)+ and let νk1/r denote the price of hk1/r(x) =
(|x| − k1/r)+. Also assuming that Skeptic is allowed to sell and combine these hedges
within his collateral duty, we state the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let 1 < r < 2. Suppose that the set of hedges Hr in (12) is available to
Skeptic. Then in the unbounded forecasting game with Hr Skeptic can force (x1 + · · · +
xn)/n
1/r → 0.
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Remark 5.1. In this theorem Hr consists of two sets of hedges H1r and H2r. H2r is
included in H just for convenience. Each hk1/r(x) can be superreplicated and underrepli-
cated by an infinite combination of hedges from H1r and the theorem holds without H2r.
Since this makes the proof considerably messier, we include H2r in the set of hedges. We
give more discussion on this point in Section 6.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 proceeds almost in the same way as that of Theorem 4.1.
However we have to make different uses of hedges from H1r and from H2r. At first we
enumerate relevant events.
E2r = {ξ | |xn|
r ≥ n for only finite number of n}.
E3r = {ξ |
∑
n
x2n
n2/r
I{|xn|r≤n} <∞}.
Lemma 5.1. Under the condition of Theorem 5.1 Skeptic can force E2r.
Proof. For k ≥ 1, (|x|r − (k − 1))+ − (|x|
r − k)+ ≥ I[k,∞)(|x|
r) and
∞∑
n=1
(
(|xn|
r − (n− 1))+ − (|xn|
r − n)+
)
≥
∞∑
n=1
I[n,∞)(|xn|
r).
The left-hand side can be bought with the total finite price of ν0r. The rest of the proof
is the same as in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 5.2. Under the condition of Theorem 5.1 Skeptic can force E3r.
Proof. Consider the following trapezoidal hedge
Tkr(x) = (|x|
r − (k − 1))+ − (|x|
r − k)+ −
(
(|x|r − (k + 1))+ − (|x|
r − (k + 2))+
)
=


0, |x|r ≤ k − 1
|x|r − (k − 1), k − 1 < |x|r ≤ k
1, k < |x|r ≤ k + 1
k + 2− |x|r, k + 1 < |x|r ≤ k + 2
0, k + 2 < |x|r
≥ I[k,k+1](|x|
r)
with the price µkr = νk+2,r − νk+1,r − νkr + νk−1,r.
At round n Skeptic is to buy (k+1)2 units of the hedge Tkr for each k = 0, 1, . . . , n−1.
We note
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2Tkr(xn) ≥ x
2
nI{|xn|r≤n}.
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Dividing the above by n2/r and summing up over all rounds n = 1, 2, . . . , we have
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2
n2/r
Tkr(xn) ≥
∞∑
n=1
x2n
n2/r
I{|xn|r≤n}.
As in the previous section, for the consideration of the total price, we can replace Tkr(xn)
by Tkr(x1). Then the left-hand side can be evaluated as
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2
n2/r
Tkr(x1) =
∞∑
n=1
1
n2/r
n∑
l=1
l2Tl−1,r(x1) =
∞∑
l=1
l2Tl−1,r(x1)
∞∑
n=l
1
n2/r
≤
2(2/r)−1
(2/r)− 1
∞∑
l=1
1
l(2/r)−1
l2Tl−1,r(x1)
≤
2(2/r)−1
(2/r)− 1
∞∑
l=1
1
l(2/r)−1
(l1/r)2−rlrTl−1,r(x1)
≤
2(2/r)−1
(2/r)− 1
∞∑
l=1
lrTl−1,r(x1) ≤
3 · 2(2/r)−1
(2/r)− 1
|x1|
r.
Since |x1|
r is available to Skeptic with finite price ν0r, the left-hand side is also available
to him with the total finite price
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)2
n2/r
µkr ≤
3 · 2(2/r)−1
(2/r)− 1
ν0r.
So far we have used hedges from H1r for forcing various events. In the following xn
will be hedged by elements from H2r. We hedge xn by hn1/r(xn) = (|xn| − n
1/r)+. Write
xnn,r = xn + (|xn| − n
1/r)+.
This has the price νn1/r . On E2r, xnn,r and xnI{|xn|r≤n} differ only for finite number of n.
Therefore conditional on E2r, Skeptic can force
E ′3r = {ξ |
∑
n
x2nn,r
n2/r
<∞}. (13)
Lemma 5.3. Under the condition of Theorem 5.1 and conditional on E2r, Skeptic can
force
E5r = {ξ |
∑
n
(xnn,r − νn1/r)
2
n2/r
<∞}.
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Proof. ∑
n
(xnn,r − νn1/r)
2
n2/r
≤ 2
∑
n
x2nn,r
n2/r
+ 2
∑
n
ν2
n1/r
n2/r
.
Both terms are finite on E2r.
Now we use the ǫ-strategy as before.
Lemma 5.4. Under the condition of Theorem 5.1 Skeptic can weakly force
E ′4r = {ξ |
∑
n
xnn,r − νn1/r
n1/r
converges to a finite value}
conditional on E2r ∩ E
′
3r.
Proof. We take ǫ as
0 < ǫ <
1
2(1 + ν0)
,
and consider Skeptic’s strategy betting ǫKn−1/n on xn,n − νn1/r at round n. Then his
capital at the end of round n is
Kn = Kn−1(1 +
ǫ
n
(xnn,r − νn1/r)) = K0
n∏
i=1
(1 +
ǫ
i
(xii,r − νi1/r)).
By the choice of ǫ and |xii,r/i
1/r| ≤ 1,
ǫ
i1/r
(xii,r − νi1/r) ≥ −
1
2
,
so that from log(1 + t) ≥ t− t2 for t ≥ −1/2, his log capital is bounded from below as
logKn ≥ logK0 + ǫ
n∑
i=1
xii,r − νi1/r
i1/r
− ǫ2
n∑
i=1
(xii,r − νi1/r)
2
i2/r
.
In the right-hand side the third term is bounded on E5r. By considering this inequality
for the interval n ≤ i ≤ n′,
logKn′ − logKn−1 ≥ ǫ
n′∑
i=n
xii,r − νi1/r
i1/r
− ǫ2
n′∑
i=n
(xii,r − νi1/r)
2
i2/r
.
In the above logKn converges to a finite limit almost surely, and thus as before
n∑
i=1
xii,r − νi1/r
i1/r
converges almost surely.
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We now need to take care of n−1/r
∑n
i=1 νi1/r .
Lemma 5.5.
1
n1/r
n∑
i=1
νi1/r → 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Since r > 1 (
1−
n1/r
|x|
)
+
≤
(
1−
n
|x|r
)
+
, ∀x.
Also for |x| ≥ n1/r we have |x|r−1 ≥ n1−1/r. Therefore
(|x| − n1/r)+ = |x|
(
1−
n1/r
|x|
)
+
≤
|x|r−1
n1−1/r
|x|
(
1−
n
|x|r
)
+
= n1/r−1(|x|r − n)+
It follows that the prices of (|x| − n1/r)+ and (|x|
r − n)+ have to satisfy
νn1/r ≤ n
1/r−1νnr.
Therefore
1
n1/r
n∑
i=1
νi1/r ≤
1
n1/r
n∑
i=1
i1/r−1νir.
Note that νir → 0 as i → ∞ by the argument in Appendix B. Then the right-hand side
converges to 0 as n→∞ by Cesa`ro’s lemma (12.6 of [10]).
Now by an extended form of Kronecker’s lemma (12.7 of [10])
1
n1/r
n∑
i=1
(xii,r − νi1/r) =
1
n1/r
n∑
i=1
xii,r −
1
n1/r
n∑
i=1
νi1/r → 0 as n→∞.
so that
∑n
i=1 xi,i/n
1/r also converges to 0. Since xn and xnn,r differ only for finite number
of n on E2r, it follows that (x1+· · ·+xn)/n
1/r converges to 0 almost surely. This completes
the proof of Theorem 5.1.
6 Some discussions
In this paper we proved various game-theoretic versions of SLLN for unbounded variables.
In Section 4 we proved a version corresponding to the sample average of i.i.d. measure-
theoretic random variables. There we assumed availability of countable symmetric call
option type hedges. We chose this set of hedges for convenience and concreteness. Other
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choices are equally conceivable, as long as the set of hedges is rich enough to produce
step-function type hedges (cf. Figure 2).
We might as well assume that if a hedge h is available to Skeptic, all other hedges
weaker then h are available to him with price no more than that of h. We call a set of
hedges H weakly closed if
h ∈ H, 0 ≤ g(x) ≤ h(x), ∀x ∈ R ⇒ g ∈ H.
We might argue that this is a reasonable assumption, because if h is available to Skeptic,
he can ask to buy a weaker g with the same price as h and someone should be willing to
sell g to Skeptic with the same price, because it presents an arbitrage opportunity to the
seller. If H is weakly closed, then for each t ∈ R
I(−∞,t](x)
has to be available to Skeptic. This shows that if H is weakly closed, then the entire
distribution function of the Reality’s move x is priced in the game. The assumption of
weakly closed H seems to be too strong from game-theoretic viewpoints. However we
should mention that in measure-theoretic proofs the probability distribution is assumed
and truncation is freely used.
The discussion on generality of probability games in Chapter 8 of Shafer and Vovk
(2001) convincingly argues that measure-theoretic martingales can be reduced to game-
theoretic martingales. If we interpret Theorem 3.1 in measure-theoretic terms and just
rewrite our proof in measure-theoretic terms, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 6.1. Let {Yn} be a measure-theoretic martingale adapted to an increasing
family of σ-fields {Fn}. Let h be a function satisfying (A1)–(A3). If the measure-theoretic
conditional expectation
E[h(Yn − Yn−1) | Fn−1]
is uniformly bounded, then P (limn Yn/n = 0) = 1.
Except for Proposition 2.1 we could avoid measure theory to establish our theorems.
We believe that this again shows effectiveness of game-theoretic proofs as we have shown
in our previous works ([5], [4]).
For the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law in Section 5 we have given a game-theoretic
proof for r > 1. We also assumed availability of two kinds of hedges for convenience as
we discussed in Remark 5.1. If we make the blanket assumption that H is weakly closed,
then we believe that measure-theoretic proof of the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong for
0 < r < 1 can be translated to game-theoretic proof without too many modifications.
From game-theoretic viewpoint however, the case r < 1 does not seem to be natural.
A Proofs of Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We argue by contradiction. Suppose there exists Skeptic’s
strategy P which allows Skeptic to observe his collateral duty with the initial capital
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K0 = 1 and limnK
P
n = ∞ whenever sn/n
1/r 6→ 0, where sn = x1 + · · ·+ xn. Consider a
random strategy of Reality, where each xn, n > ν, is independently chosen as
P (xn = 0) = 1−
ν
n
, P (xn = n
1/r) = P (xn = −n
1/r) =
ν
2n
.
Here ν is the price of h(x) = |x|r. Then by the second part of measure-theoretic Borel-
Cantelli lemma
1 = P (|xn| = n
1/r i.o.) = P (|xn|/n
1/r = 1 i.o.). (14)
Note that if sn/n
1/r → 0, then xn/n
1/r → 0 because
sn
n1/r
=
(n− 1
n
)1/r sn−1
(n− 1)1/r
+
xn
n1/r
.
Therefore (14) implies that P (sn/n
1/r → 0) = 0. Then by our assumption P (KPn →
∞) = 1. However under the randomized strategy of Reality KPn is a measure-theoretic
non-negative martingale and its measure-theoretic expectation is E(KPn ) = K0 = 1. Then
by Doob’s martingale inequality (e.g. Theorem 14.6 of [10])
P (max
k≤n
KPk ≥ c) ≤
1
c
, ∀c > 0, ∀n.
and P (supnK
P
n ≥ c) ≤ 1/c. But this contradicts P (K
P
n →∞) = 1. .
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider a random strategy of Reality, where each xn for
n, h(n) > ν, is independently chosen as
P (xn = 0) = 1−
ν
h(n)
, P (xn = n) = P (xn = −n) =
ν
2h(n)
.
The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 2.1. 
B Proof of the fact limk→∞ νk = 0
Consider the identity for x ∈ R:
|x| =
∞∑
k=0
(
(|x| − k)+ − (|x| − k − 1)+
)
. (15)
For each real x, the right-hand side is actually a finite sum and there is no question on
the convergence. On the other hand consider the identity
ν0 =
K−1∑
k=0
(νk − νk+1) + νK .
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Since {νk} is a monotone non-increasing sequence of non-negative reals
c = lim
K→∞
νK ≥ 0
exists. If c > 0 then, ν0 >
∑∞
k=0(νk − νk+1). But then Skeptic can sell |x| and buy the
right-hand side of (15) and he is certain to make money. This contradicts the assumption
of coherence.
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